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Abstract 
 
This paper provides guidelines to classify biometric 
systems based on the level of privacy and security risks 
associated with their transactions. The classification of 
biometric systems as Basic, Medium or Advanced 
details how the transactions make use of biometric 
information for one or more purposes, such as, 
authorisation, accountability and analysis of sensitive 
data. An adaptive framework proposed here considers 
this classification as the fundamental building block in 
providing a step-wise implementation procedure for 
implementing biometric systems.    It is believed that by 
adopting such an adaptive framework, societies, 
businesses and government would be able to harness 
the benefits of biometrics.  This would pave way for a 
significantly faster diffusion of biometric systems in 
many everyday life scenarios.    
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1. Introduction 
 
    With the escalating increase in security breaches and 
transaction frauds being witnessed today, the need for 
highly secure identification and personal verification 
systems is warranted [1], [2], [3].  A biometric system, 
which is essentially a pattern recognition system, 
automatically recognises a person using physiological 
or behavioural traits such as fingerprints, hand 
geometry, signature, retina or voice [4].  This emerging 
technology could play a major role in addressing the 
prevalent security and information protection issues 
faced by a wide variety of everyday applications [1], 
[3].  However, biometrics is still in its early stage of 
adoption as it is surrounded by many issues related to 
cost, technology and privacy [5], [6], [7].  While much 
research studies have been done with regard to 
technology improvements and cost viability [3], [8], 
there is a paucity of research that focuses on addressing 
the privacy and security issues [5], [6]. Recent studies 
indicate that the privacy / security risk of biometrics is 
the predominant factor that has become the stumbling 
block for its diffusion today [8], [9].   
    In this paper, the main objective is to study the 
privacy and security issues / challenges faced by 
biometrics and thereby propose an adaptive framework 
that provides a step-wise guideline for a successful 
implementation of biometric systems.    Section 2 of 
this paper highlights some related work found in 
literature that motivated this study.  In Section 3, the 
impact of biometrics in societies, businesses and 
government are analysed in typical scenarios where 
biometric transactions could take place.  With privacy / 
security risk as the major adoption factor, biometric 
transactions are classified based on the level of such 
risks. Section 4 describes the proposed adaptive 
framework that paves way towards successfully 
implementing a highly secured biometric system. 
Finally, Section 5 provides the conclusions and future 
research directions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
    Research studies conducted on various biometric 
techniques indicate that fingerprint, face, iris, voice, 
signature, and hand geometry have matured well 
enough to become the de-facto authentication system to 
identify a person uniquely [2], [7], [8], [9]. Recently, 
biometric modalities such as DNA samples, gait, ear 
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contours and the like are being explored and are in the 
various stages of development and assessment [10], 
[11], [12]. It is envisaged that biometrics is capable of 
becoming part and parcel of everyday life as biometric 
identification and verification would increasingly be 
adopted in business transactions, public sectors, crime 
detection, law enforcement and other environments 
such as home and schools [13], [14]. However, one 
cannot identify any single biometric modality to be the 
best for all implementations as there are many 
influencing factors impacting on the success of 
biometric systems [2], [15], [16], [17].  
    Much research has addressed the tangible factors 
such as, technology, reliability and cost that could 
impact the development of biometric systems [15], 
[17]. Many studies concentrate on reducing possible 
errors in biometric matching systems, such as, False 
Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate 
(FRR) and in reliable encryption methods [3], [8]. 
However, studies indicate that privacy / security risk is 
the key intangible factor that has a major influence on 
the user acceptance of such systems [16], [18], [19], 
[20]. The following factors identified from the 
literature survey conducted in this study have been the 
motivating factor for this research work: 
I. There is a false fear prevailing among the public 
that biometric sensors could potentially hinder their 
health and safety [22].   
II. Information security policies and compliance 
statutes have undergone considerable changes over 
the last few years both locally and globally and this 
has affected biometric diffusion [9], [12].   
III. Different biometric technologies are at different 
stages of maturity and there is no single modality 
that could become the standard for all applications 
[21], [10], [11] and this could impact very much on 
their commercial adoption. 
IV. The easiness of biometric enrollment and its 
permanence (tolerant or non-tolerant) varies among 
different biometric modalities [23], [24].  Frequent 
and multiple biometric enrollments for different 
situations pose a major inconvenience to the users 
[25]. 
V. User confidence is also affected based on the extent 
to which biometric data is used, whether the system 
allows exchange of biometric data with other 
systems and leads to function creep [12], [26]. 
 
It is, therefore, important to understand the purpose 
and to what extent any information processing 
transaction uses biometrics. In view of these findings 
from literature, in the next section, this research takes 
the first step to classify biometric transactions based on 
the level of privacy / security risk involved. 
 
3. Classification of Biometric Transactions 
 
    Research studies indicate that privacy / security risk 
is the key factor for society to be slow in adopting 
biometrics [9], [12], [16].  Hence, this research 
considers various types of biometric transactions that 
are possible in commercial and non-commercial 
scenarios so as to classify them based on the level of 
privacy / security risk associated with them.   This is 
summarised in Figure 1 with the following three main 
privacy / security risk levels under which any biometric 
transaction would be classified: 
I. Basic-level – Biometric transactions fall under 
this category if they are mainly authorisation-based 
transactions that have minimum privacy risk as the 
biometric data is normally used only for verification 
of identity.  Common scenarios where such 
biometric transactions take place are, access to 
physical locations (laboratories, bank lockers, 
membership premises, etc.), authorisation of 
payments (online payments, ATMs, etc.) or even 
regulating certain physical controls (power supply, 
heaters, etc.) at office or at home. Such transactions 
have a low level of privacy / security risk as 
biometric data is not stored anywhere while being 
processed. 
II. Medium-level - As a next level to identification 
are accountability-based transactions that record 
biometric identities of individuals to determine 
when (time-based) or for what purposes (resource-
based) tasks have been accomplished by them.   
Such transactions could typically prevail in 
societies that make use of biometrics, say in fee 
calculation based on time spent or in other public 
service based on resource utilisation. Businesses 
and government services could use biometric 
identities for determining the time of approvals or 
completion of tasks (e.g., online purchase 
approvals, aircraft boarding, etc.). Such transactions 
have a medium level of privacy / security risk as the 
biometric data is stored as part of the history of 
transactions for future reference. 
III. Advanced-level – Transactions at this level access 
and process sensitive information using an 
individual’s biometric identity. Such personal 
information retrieval-based transactions are used to 
perform behaviour analysis (e.g., profiling 
customers or employees, crime detection, etc.) or 
health analysis (e.g., patient treatment, employee 
recruitment, etc.).  These would have the highest 
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privacy risk as the biometric data is not only stored 
as part of the transactions but could also be used to 
retrieve their personal information to extrapolate 
the physical and mental faculties of individuals. 
 
Figure 1. Risk-Based Classification of Biometric 
Transactions 
 
    Overall, privacy / security risks could be identified 
with biometrics during the very first interaction with 
the user, namely, the enrollment process, when 
biometric data is collected and stored as signatures or 
normalised as templates.  Next, it is the verification 
stage, when risks could be associated at the time of 
matching or data transmission. Finally, at the 
application level, risks are associated based on the type 
of transaction as described above.  Hence, the 
abovementioned classification of all the biometric 
transactions that are required for an application would 
help in determining and addressing the associated 
privacy / security risk levels.  The next section uses this 
classification methodology to arrive at an adaptive 
framework for successfully implementing biometric 
systems. 
 
4. An Adaptive Biometric Framework 
 
    An adaptive framework for implementing biometric 
systems is proposed here with the goal of enhancing 
user adoption through minimizing privacy / security 
risks.  This is achieved as the framework aims at 
promoting multimodality and pseudonym operations 
using an encrypted one-stop database that ensures high 
security and reliability levels at the same time, 
leverages on the simplicity of “enroll once” policy.  
Such a framework, on one hand incorporates the 
desired flexibility and convenience for the users, and 
on the other hand caters to the privacy / security risk 
issues as well. This framework addresses the 
complexity of potential biometric systems so that 
specific implementations of biometric technology could 
follow the guidelines specified here to customize the 
deployment for different scenarios effectively.  
    The framework consists of the following four 
components to be considered as building blocks for a 
successful biometric implementation: 
I. Biometric Technology Component – This 
component addresses the technology issues 
surrounding the possible biometric system 
considered for implementation. It considers 
techniques relating to the different biometric 
modalities that could be considered for the 
enrollment process. Based on the biometric 
modalities considered, suitable pseudonym 
operations could be identified for the verification as 
well as application level transactions.  This 
component also determines the. encryption 
techniques that could be adopted for data storage or 
while transmitting data during enrollment, 
verification and application-level transaction 
processing.   
II. Privacy / Security Risk Component – This 
component addresses the user concerns with respect 
to privacy and security fears.  Apart from 
identifying the risks associated with the sensors 
used and the templates created during the 
enrollment process, it also considers the risks 
associated during the verification and transaction 
processing stages in biometrics.   
III. One-Stop Database Component – This component 
deals with the various methods of biometric data 
storage and retrieval.  It considers the importance of 
“enroll once” facility to reduce the burden of 
multiple enrollments for different applications at 
different points of time.  Such a one-stop database 
component could also cater for storing the 
necessary biometric data (signatures and meta-data) 
gathered from national and international sources as 
well as agencies that could aid in developing the 
centralised database. 
IV. External Factor Component – This component 
addresses the external factors that could affect the 
implementation of the biometric system.  It ensures 
that appropriate international biometric standards 
are considered and that the local government 
policies / laws are adhered to.  
Basic Level: Authorisation-based 
Transactions 
- Automated Financial Services 
- Physical Access 
- Physical Controls  
Medium Level: Accountability-based 
Transactions  
- Time-based Accountability 
- Resource-based Accountability 
Advanced Level: Personal 
Information-based Transactions 
- Health-based Analysis 
- Behaviour-based Extrapolation 
Privacy / Security Risk Levels 
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These four components of the framework have an 
impact on one another and their relationships are 
summarised in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.   Components of the Adaptive Biometric 
Framework  
 
    The following seven steps (Figure 3) provide a 
guideline for adopting the adaptive biometric 
framework for organisations venturing into biometrics: 
Step 1: Determine the transaction classification (refer to 
Section 3) where the biometric system would 
possibly fit into. This would be based on the 
goals and objectives of the biometric system. 
Step 2: Identify the risks associated with enrollment, 
verification and application transactions. 
Identify those transactions that are under low-
level, medium-level and advanced-level privacy 
/ security risks. 
Step 3: Choose suitable modalities of biometrics so as 
to address the enrollment, verification and 
application risks. 
Step 4: Adopt appropriate levels of encryption for 
templates, data transmission and data storage 
and identify the processes where pseudonymous 
biometrics could be applied. 
Step 5: Design and implement a one-stop database of 
biometric signatures and other meta-data that 
could possibly be collected from agencies and 
local enrollments conducted by national as well 
as international bodies. 
Step 6: Verify that the system and processes conform to 
consortium standards, government laws and 
policies. 
Step 7: Perform post-evaluation of technologies and 
risks. Determine any risks that are not addressed 
in the above steps. Introduce new modalities of 
biometrics as the situation warrants and as new 
technologies emerge. 
 
Figure 3.   Step-wise Adaptive Framework for Biometric 
System Implementation 
 
5. Conclusions and Future Research 
 
    Biometrics, a fast growing emerging area with latest 
robust technologies such as DNA fingerprinting and 
vein-sampling, is still slow in its adoption due to the  
privacy / security risks associated with their transaction 
processing. Hence, this paper takes the first step to 
classify the biometric transactions based on the level of 
privacy intrusion so that one could understand the risk 
level to be addressed before venturing into biometrics. 
Next, the proposed adaptive framework with four 
components follows a generic model with a seven-step 
guideline that could be adopted for specific deployment 
of biometrics in business, government and society.  
Future research would be to apply this framework for a 
case scenario in Australia.  This paper is another step 
forward paving the way for further research in 
Technology Component 
Multimodal Biometric 
Pseudonymous 
Encryption Key 
Privacy / Security Risk Component  
Enrollment  
Sensors & 
Templates 
Verification  
Matching  & 
Transmission 
Application  
Pre-process  
Post-process 
External Factor Component 
Biometric Consortium Standards 
Government Policies / Laws 
One-Stop Database 
Biometric Signatures 
Meta Data 
Agency Sources 
Step 1: Determine the Classification of 
Transactions 
Step 2: Identify Privacy / Security 
Risks 
Step 3: Choose Biometric Modalities 
for Implementation 
Step 4: Adopt Encryption and  
Pseudonymous Biometrics 
Step 5: Develop a One-Stop Biometric Database  
Enrollment 
Raw Data 
Feature 
Extraction 
Signatures 
/Meta Data 
Step 6: Verify International Standards 
and Policies 
Step 7: Perform Post-Evaluation 
 
Biometric 
Modalities 
Privacy/ Security 
Risks
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implementing each of the components of the proposed 
biometric framework for any future scenario.  
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